Purpose of the article is to present in two parts the selected aspects of application of monetary policy in the euro area pre and post 2008 as well as insitutional adaptations brought by the EU legislator. Methodology/methods In order to better explain these points, the article relies partially on a comparison with the framework and application of the monetary policy by the Federal Reserve as well as on a historic method when outlining the influence of definition of financial stability from the ECB/Eurosystem towards other prominent central banks. Scientific aim The article presents selected aspects of the monetary policy in the part of the EU where single currency was introduced in order to outline state of the art governance structure as well as a certain institutional creativity in application of powers conferred upon the central banks by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The goal is to prove (i) the hypothesis of robustness of the framework and (ii) present the limits that can only be pushed further by the legislative power. The conclusions confirm on the one hand that the framework of monetary policy based on strong institutional safeguards such as legislative power and independence is very resilient and can prove efficient and creative enough to stabilise an innovative monetary system, however, on the other hand, validate the hypothesis that certain adaptations can only be performed on the basis of a legislative adaptations.
Introduction
This article is divided in two parts -this first one covers the framework available and policies of the ECB/Eurosystem available pre-2008. It outlines the mandate and governance that are the foundation to the application of monetary policy and aims at proving the hypothesis that the framework is robust enough to assume its roles in times of market turmoil. However, fully-fledged financial and economic crisis requires certain institutional flexibility and often also strengthening and widening of the mandate that in a rule of law can only be done by the legislative power.
Mandate and Governance specificities
Monetary policy is an exclusive EU policy for EU Member States that adopted the euro. 1 The governance is organised in a decentralised manner: the Eurosystem that consists of the National Central Banks (NCBs) of the euro area and the ECB, 2 applies the monetary policy in the various Member States via the respective NCBs.
Article 9.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB
The ECB shall ensure that the tasks conferred upon the ESCB under Article 127 (2) , (3) and (5) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are implemented either by its own activities pursuant to this Statute or through the national central banks pursuant to Articles 12.1 and 14.
The supreme governing body of the European Central Bank and of the whole Eurosystem is the same -the Governing Council that is composed of Governors of the NCBs of the euro area and members of the Executive Board. 3 The latter is composed of the President, Vice-President and four other members, bringing it to total of 6 members. 4 The composition of the Governing Council reflects the balance between the Union (federalist) approach and inter-state (national) approach as it combines the members coming from national institutions (NCBs) and EU institution (ECB). Further, the federal element in the supreme decision making bodies is guaranteed by the specific limitations of the voting participation by the NCB governors. Until end 2014, all 18 NCB governors have been voting on each occasion, however, the accession of Lithuania will trigger a rotation in voting rights. Indeed, according to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, the rotation of voting can only be postponed by two thirds vote of the Governing Council until the number of Governors exceeds 18. Therefore, as of 1 January 2015, the rotation will start as follows: the five largest states in terms of the size of economy and the financial sector 5 will share 4 votes and the further 14 states will share 11 votes. This will ensure a permanent relation between the federalist element (Executive Board) representing 40% and Member State element (NCB governors) representing 60% of the voting rights. One could draw a parallel here to the voting architecture of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve where 4 out of 12 votes rotate while 8 are permanent.
Legal framework and application
The establishment of the ECB, Eurosystem and European System of Central Banks is based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB.
Single mandate
Eurosystem has quite narrow mandate where the support of the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union, e.g. full employment and balanced economic growth, are clearly subordinated primary objective of price stability. 6 If compared with e.g. the Federal Reserve, one could say that it is a single mandate, that being the price stability, in contrast to the Fed's dual mandate, price stability and close to maximum employ-ment. 7 The first part of the mandate that is defined by the Governing There are certainly distinctions with respect to the governance of the definition of price stability in terms of increase in consumer prices (e.g. ECB Governing Council decides independently and Bank of England acts on the basis of written instruction from the Treasury represented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 17 ).
Single working language regime
Germany showed a lot of pragmatism by not requiring that the language of the Member State where the ECB is established 18 is the dominant working language of the ECB. This was the case of other EU institutions where the French held a prominent role -not only with respect to EU Parliament that has the primary seat in Strasbourg and the Secretariat in Luxembourg as well as the EU Commission that is primarily established in Brussels, but most prominently in the Court of Justice where proficient knowledge of French was until EU enlargement of 2004 an essential condition of recruitment. The pragmatism of not only Germany but the whole Eurosystem (i.e. NCBs) by allowing English to become single working language 19 permitted a very smooth enlargement of the euro area, as the experts coming from the 10 new member states (and later Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) were typically mostly fluent in English.
The working language is consistently applied also by the top executive powers of the ECB, the President, Vice-President and the whole Executive Board. The various members observe the language regime when appearing e.g. before the Committees of the European Parliament. 20 Further, the choice of one working language permitted an efficient management of the crisis. The preparation of legal acts as well as opinions on an important volume of Union and national legal acts was swift also due to the single working language regime. Indeed, this allowed for the legal acts to be discussed between the NCBs and ECB at the level of various committees and once agreed, adopted and translated into Union languages. If these acts had to be negotiated in several languages, each draft amendment would have been translated into all official languages and this would definitely have slowed down the process. Further, the Eurosystem relies very much on modern technical means of communication such as teleconferences and emails that are different from the meetings in person that are typically in mind of people when talking about negotiations at the Union level. For the meeting in classical sense, one can imagine linguists arranging for translations in various Union languages. However, as the translations at the Eurosystem level are only operated at the end of the process, once legal acts adopted, the ECB can allow having quite lean translation service.
Independence 21
According to Article 130 of the TFEU, neither the ECB nor the NCBs nor members of their decision making bodies are allowed to seek or take instructions from EU or Member States bodies. This is one of the sources for credibility of Eurosystem when fulfilling its tasks, not only in monetary policy field, but also, as outlined below, in the supervisory field. The political independence is not sufficient in itself. In order to properly function, the central banks of the Eurosystem need to dispose of sufficient financial and human resources in order to fulfil their tasks. This is the reason why ECB in its opinions stresses that when NCBs are vested with other tasks based on national law, the legislator shall make sure that the resources needed to fulfil their tasks based on Treaties do not suffer.
Article 130 TFEU

Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 November 2011 on the amendments to Lietuvos bankas' profit distribution rules (CON/2011/91) […] The concept of financial independence should be assessed from the perspective of whether any third party is able to exercise either direct or indirect influence not only over an NCB's tasks, but also over its ability to fulfil its mandate, both operationally in terms of manpower and financially in terms of appropriate financial resources. A Member State may not put its NCB in a position where it has insufficient financial resources to carry out its ESCB-related tasks. NCBs must also have sufficient financial means to carry out their other functions at all times, i.e. they must be able to perform their national tasks, to meet their international obligations and to properly cover their administrative and operational expenses.
The Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB even allows for Governing Council to oppose functions assumed by the NCBs, if these would interfere with the ESCB objectives.
Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB National central banks may perform functions other than those specified in this Statute unless the Governing Council finds, by a majority of two thirds of the votes cast, that these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. Such functions shall be performed on the responsibility and liability of national central banks and shall not be regarded as being part of the functions of the ESCB.
The independence extends further to the specific safeguards granted to the Governor of each central bank. His mandate has to be sufficiently long in order not to suffer from factual political influence from the relevant Member State and each Governor can only be relieved from its functions in case of a serious misconduct or if he no longer fulfils conditions to assume the office. It is understood, that the conditions for assuming the office need to be clearly stated in the relevant national law.
Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB The statutes of the national central banks shall, in particular, provide that the term of office of a Governor of a national central bank shall be no less than five years. A Governor may be relieved from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct. A decision to this effect may be referred to the Court of Justice by the Governor concerned or the Governing Council on grounds of infringement of these Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application. Such proceedings shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the decision or of its notification to the plaintiff or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.
Legislative and economic approach to monetary policy
The EU legislator vested the Eurosystem with its own legislative powers that show similarities to general secondary (derived) EU law. These, in addition to institutional safegueards as mentioned above, form a basis for the implementation of montery policy from economic perspective, i.e. setting up of interest rates and management of inflation expectations.
Legislative approach to monetary policy
The European legislator granted the Eurosystem legislative powers to adopt legal acts in application of its tasks, such as adopting framework for monetary policy 22 including minimum reserves. 23 Similarly to the general secondary (derived) EU law, the Eurosystem adopts the following types of legal acts: a) Regulations -these are of general application and are binding in their entirety and directly applicable to the counterparties of monetary policy; b) Decisions -these are binding in their entirety on the addressees. However, it should be noted that there exist decisions without addressees -e.g. when modifying a guideline in urgency; 24 c) Recommendations and opinions -these are not legally binding and weight onto addresses solely by the credibility, reputation and moral suasion of the Eurosystem. However, with respect to opinions on any proposed Union act or national act in its field of competence, the ECB is on one hand obliged to render the opinion and on the other hand has a right to require that this consultation be respected by the relevant Union or national institutions or authorities. Therefore, while these opinions are not binding as such, the obligation to consult the ECB binding is; d) Guidelines -these are binding, with respect to the result to be achieved, upon Eurosystem NCBs to which it is addressed. The latter has a choice with respect to the form and methods of implementation within the timeframe granted by the relevant guideline (e.g. these rules can be implemented contractually or via a legal act, if the relevant NCB has legislative powers).
Similarly to the Commission that verifies implementation of directives by the Member States, the ECB verifies implementation of the guidelines by the National Central Banks.
With respect to the legislative technique, the legal acts of the Eurosystem have a form of legal acts of the ECB as the latter one has its own distinct legal personality. [...] 
Economic approach to monetary policy
Eurosystem ensures price stability in the euro area by driving the inflation expectations of economic agents by pledging to close to but under 2% inflation in medium term and via this anchoring inflation expectations also in the general public. It could also be understood as a form of forward guidance. Central bank achieves this by managing the interest rates via the transmission mechanism. The Eurosystem up to now decides on interest rates on the first Thursday of every month. The meeting of the Governing Council is followed by an introductory statement and a press conference. This is important counterpart of independence -the transparency and accountability. The latter not only translates by public hearings in the European Parliament of the ECB President, but also by the above mentioned press conferences where the ECB President and Vice President present the decisions of Governing Council and Eurosystem expectations of economic development e.g. by presenting ECB staff projections. The ECB President regularly appeals to EU and national institutions and authorities also on other different measures that the Eurosystem deems to be necessary for the monetary policy to work in the framework of the EMU, such as structural reforms and budgetary policy. The inflation expectations are driven by setting three types of interest rates: a) Marginal lending facility -Eurosystem counterparties can draw on overnight facility by pledging the eligible assets as collateral. There is no limit for this facility, but for the availability of collateral to be presented as a guarantee for the desired liquidity.
b) Deposit facility -Eurosystem counterparties can deposit overnight the excess liquidity they may have. There is typically no limit for these deposits. Eurosystem Central Banks do not provide collateral for these deposits.
c) Main refinancing operations -this rate is applicable to MROs and LTROs. The liquidity is allocated on the basis of fixed or variable tender procedure. The former typically involves counterparties bidding for a fixed amount of liquidity where main refinancing operations rate is the floor for bidding. The latter is typically full allotment of liquidity bids for a fixed rate.
If the central bank reaches zero lower bound on interest rate, it can resort to unconventional policies, such as quantitative easing (purchasing of government bonds), enhanced forward guidance (announcing in addition to inflation expectations and targets also the period of time that it would keep certain interest rate, nominal GDP targeting etc.). For example the Fed put in recent years the onus on the first possibility while the Eurosystem put onus on the second possibility via e.g. targeted long term refinancing operations and introduction of negative interest rates in on the deposit facility.
Finally, the Eurosystem can resort to liquidity absorbing operations by e.g. increasing minimum reserves requirements 26 or by issuance of ECB debt certificates.
[continued -second part]
